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Introduction 
The main objective of this report has been to investigate whether during the Weimar 
period (1919-1933) large German banks operated in the way predicted by the Austrian 
marxist Rudo1fHi1ferding in his magnum opus Das Finanzkapilal (1910). Hi1ferding 
analysed the nature of the relationship between banking and industry, focusing, like 
other researchers before and after him, on two types of data: on the one hand he 
studied the role of flllancial instruments, like bank loans to industry and bank 
involvement in the issuing of shares for industrial companies; on the other, Hilferding 
commented on the role of institutional instruments, in particular the importance of 
bank representation on the supervisory boards of other furns. 
My own research been mainly focused on the second type of data mentioned above, 
i.e. big bank-representation on the supervisory boards of other German firms . 
Specifically, by analysing how Grossbank-representation on the supervisory boards of 
other German firms evolved during the Weimar period, an attempt has been made to 
ascertain whether available data justify Hilferding's assumptions about an increasing 
involvement oflarge German banks in all sectors of the economy. Research done on 
supervisory board data was compared to information on bank loans. Furthermore, the 
debate about whether having seats on supervisory boards of industrial furns allowed 
large banks to shape firm policy was touched upon by looking at two issues: exclusive 
bank -firm relations and the accumulation of supervisory board seats by individual 
bank directors. 
Although the period under investigation is a relatively short one, it seems to be best 
suited for the purpose of this research. It is the only period shortly after the publication 
of Das Finanzkapilal, which was not dominated by war, like the years 1914-1918, or 
increased state intervention in the economy in preparation for war, like after 1933. 
1 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The ftrst chapter presents an overview 
of debates. Hilferding's theory of finance capitalism as well as further debates aboute 
bank-industry relations in the years 1870-1913 and during the Weimar period are 
reviewed. The second chapter deals with the formulation of hypotheses and questions 
related to the use of data. In the third chapter results are reported. The conclusion is 
presented the final chapter. 
1. Debates 
1.1 Hilferding on the importance of banks in modern capitalism 
When the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding published Das Finanzkapital in 1910, 
he claimed to have completed the analysis of capitalism pioneered by Marx in Das 
Kapital. According to Hilferding, in Das Kapital Marx had mainly analysed a 
competitive phase of capitalism, most relevant for mid-nineteenth century Britain. 
Since then, Hilferding claimed, there had been a transition to a new phase of 
capitalism, supposedly the highest phase of capitalism, dominated by what he called 
'Finance Capital' . 1 "Finance Capital", Hilferding wrote, "means the uniftcation of 
capital. The earlier separation of industrial, commercial and bank capital is now ended 
and all are placed under the common leadership of high [mance, into which the leaders 
of industry and banking are united by personal links. This unification means the 
replacement of free competition of individual capitalists by the big monopolistic 
associations. ,,2 
Whereas Britain had been the prototype capitalist country in Das Kapital, Hilferding's 
work was inspired primarily by economic development in Germany since the 
foundation of the Second Empire in 1870. Although Hilferding gave serious attention 
1 R. Hi l fe rding, Das Fi nanzkapi ta l (Frankf urt am Main , 1968), p . 17. 
2 Ibid., p. 406 . 
2 
to vertical and horizontal integration in industry, what he perceived to be the most 
remarkable aspect of fmance capital in Germany was the co-ordinating role of large 
banks, both within and across industrial sectors. Das Finanzkapital contains both 
passages in which Hilferding appears to suggest banks were the 'stronger' partner in 
relationship to indUStry), and statements pointing to an amalgamation of interests of 
big business and large banks.4 
Hilferding recognised that the process of concentration had started in the heavy industries, 
but he expected it soon to be covering the economy as a whole: "The independent industries 
are, as we saw, becoming more dependent on cartelised industries and eventually will be 
absorbed by them. The result of this process is a general cartel. All capitalist production 
will be co-ordinated by one institution, that regulates all sectors of production."s Given the 
role of co-ordinators Hilferding ascribed to the Grossbanken, it is not surprising that he 
suggested a quite simple revolutionary strategy for a future socialist German government: 
"The take-over of the six Berlin Great Banks would already today secure control over the 
largest industries and during the time of transition C ... ) make the implementation of a 
socialist programme much easier.,,6 
The debate about the role of big banks in German economic development, however, 
did not end with the publication of Das Finanzkapital. With regard to supervisory 
board representation of the Great Banks, several problems of interpretation emerged in 
later discussions, which deserve attention. I will first consider these problems, before 
addressing specific hypotheses. In the next two sections therefore, a brief outline of 
debate about bank-industry relationships in the fields of fmance and supervisory board 
Ibid., p.1l9. 
Ibid., p.157. 
Ibid. pp.321-322. 
Ibid. p.504. 
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representation, both for the period 1870-1913 and for the Weirnar period, will be 
given. 
1.2 Bank-industry relations from 1870-1913 
1.2.1 German industrialisation: whom did the Great Banks support? 
Excluding the development of the railroads from the 1840's on, the period 1870-1913 
is often regarded as the take-off phase of German industrialisation. Hilferding's work 
was elaborated upon after WWII by Gerschenkron, who placed the idea of close 
relationships between banks and industry in the context of industrialisation of 
backward economies? The Gerschenkronian view of the German banking system soon 
became the basis for an orthodoxy, which has been adhered to by scholars like Kocka 
and Chandler. 8 The Gerschenkronian school sees German industrialisation as 
dominated by large firms making use of mass-production methods (initially mainly in 
the heavy industries), which required high throughput technologies and managerial 
hierarchies to co-ordinate production, marketing and distribution. Economies of scale 
and scope are achieved by vertical and horizontal integration oftechnologically 
separable activities. Authors like Kocka recognize the importance of the Great Banks 
in providing firms with external finance, but claim they "acted like large flywheels; 
they did not initiate changes, but rather reflected exisiting trends,,9 
A. Gerschenkron, Economi c Ba ckwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
1962),p . 15 . 
See: A. Chandler I 'Germany : co-operat ive managerial capitalism ' , Scale and 
Scope. The dynamics of i n dustrial capitalism (Cambridge , Massachusets, 
1990), pp.393-456 ; J. Kocka , ' Big business and o r gan ised capitalism', The 
Cambridge economic history of Eur ope VII, part I, M. Postan and P. Mathias 
ed s. (Cambr idge, 1978). 
J. Kocka, ' The rise of t he modern i ndustrial enterprise in Germany', 
Managerial Hierarchies: c ompara t i ve perspectives on the rise of the modern 
industrial enterprise , A. Cha ndle r and H. Oaems eds. (1 980), p.92. 
4 
Orthodox thinking has been challenged by Herrigel, who has argued that "two distinct 
parallel, and internationally competitive systems of industrial organisation and 
practice, located in different regions, have characterized the German experience at all 
levels of the economy and society since the very onset of industrialisation." 1O Herrigel 
maintains that the story of German industrialisation in the nineteenth century told by 
orthodox thinkers is not untrue, but incomplete and conceptually misconceived. 11 It is 
incomplete in ignoring the importance the development of a parallel 'decentralised 
industrial order', characterized by highly specialised, decentralised, small- and 
medium sized firms, dependent on extra-firm institutions. It is misconceived in 
portraying large-firm based 'organised' or 'co-operative capitalism' as a general, 
national phenomenon, and in denying the key importance of its regional 
characteristics. 12 
According to Herrigel, the 'autarkic industrial order' of organised capitalism mainly 
arose in regions lacking dense networks of small local property holders. Areas like the 
Ruhr Valley, Northern and Eastern Westphalia, the Prussian province of Saxony, 
Berlin and Silesia, had to rely on the factory as the site of production and on the firm 
as organiser of related production processes, marketing and sales. 13 By contrast in 
regions like South-western Westphalia, Southern Hesse, Northern Wtirttemberg and 
Tiihringen networks of small property holders, partly involved in manufacturing, 
provided a fertile base for developing highly competitive small- and medium-sized 
firms, making use of extra-firm institutions.14 
10 G.Herrigel , Industrial constructions: the sources of German industrial 
power (Cambridge, 1996 ) , p.1 . 
11 Ibid., p.33. 
12 Ibid ., p . 33 . 
13 Ibid . , p.75. 
14 Ibid. I p. 36. 
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Concerning the reliance on external fmance, Herrigel sees the two industrial systems 
each making use of its own banking network. IS The decentralized order made use of 
two types of banks: co-operative and savings banks. Co-operative banks functioned as 
credit unions that pooled the resources of producers in a given area and circulated the 
funds among banks in a certain region, through creation of a regional 'central clearing 
bank'. This closed money system allowed small fmns to borrow at rates below those 
of the commercial banks. 16 Another pool of capital was provided by savings banks. 
Regional governments often placed limits on deposits and loans in order to ensure 
orientation towards smaller producers. 17 
Herrigel acknowledges that the 'autarkic industrial order' relied mainly on the Great 
Credit Banks for its external fmance. 18 Initially the Great Banks were region ally based 
(A . Schaaffen-hausensche Bankverein, for example, started in Cologne, the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft in Berlin, the Darmstiidter Bankverein in Darmstadt). The scale 
of production and capital needs of large firms however soon exceeded regional 
resources and the Great Banks began to detach themselves from their regional bases in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Herrigel emphasises however, that the fmns 
that received financial assistance of the Great Banks, remained part of a particular 
regional industrial order. 19 It is important to keep this in mind since, although the 
focus of discussion from now on will be mainly on the 'autarkic industrial order', one 
should realise, that this system of 'development assistance for the strong,20 did not 
comprise German industrialization as a whole. 
I S 
16 
1 1 
18 
19 
20 
Ibid . , pp . 53-54. 
Ibi d. , p. 53. 
Ibid . , p.54 . 
Ibid . , p. 83 . 
Ibid. , p . 86. 
R. Tilly , 'German banking 1850-1914: d evelopment assistance for the 
strong ' , Journal of Europ ean Economic His t ory XV (1986), p . 1 21 . 
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1.2.2. The Great Banks: assisting the autarkic industrial order. 
During the period 1870-1900, it has been argued, large banks may have reduced the 
problem of asymmetric information inherent in the provision of external fmance? 1 
Savers had limited information about the ftrms they provided with credit, and it was 
costly for them to monitor a ftrm's managers, who might use external finance for 
purposes which would boost their own status but not ftrm profits . For this reason 
without adequate information, supply of funds threatened to be limited. At the same 
time, during the early period of industrialisation ftrms often lacked enough internal 
resources to fmance the establishment oflarge-scale, capital-intensive industries?2 
The German universal banks are seen as having played a pioneering role particularly 
in the fmance of the railways in the 1850s and in heavy industries like, coal, steel, iron 
and electrical engineering in the 1870s and 1880s. During the latter period, it is 
claimed, the Great banks supported technologically innovative ftrms and were willing 
to take short-term risks, expecting long-term benefits.23 In this period, also, individual 
Grossbanken, tried to establish exclusive relationships with individual firms. 
Large banks have been credited with providing a solution to the problem of external 
finance in two ways. First, since the German Great banks functioned as 'universal 
banks', they combined the activities of 'commercial banks' (holding deposit accounts, 
extending overdrafts on current account as well as making long-term loans) and 
'investment banks' (issuing of shares and debentures, trading in securities, floating 
loans for government and municipalities). On the one hand, banks mobilised scattered 
21 J . Edwards and S. Ogilvie, IUniversa l banks a nd German industri alisation : a 
reappraisal', Economic History Review XLIX 3 (1 996) ,p o 429. 
22 Ibid., p,429 
2' J. Edwards a nd K. Fisher, Banks , finance and investment in Germany 
(Cambridge , 1994), pp . 1-3 . 
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savings and channelled them into industrial enterprises, and on the other, they helped 
fIrms to raise external fInance for investment through issuing shares?4 Via the current 
account relationship banks received information about a companies' soundness and 
hence its suitability for making a security issue. In this way banks could screen fIrms 
wishing to make security issues and became interested in preventing bad companies 
from driving out good ones.25 
Second, supervisory board representation was important. Since 1870 joint-stock 
companies in Germany were obliged to have a supervisory board, which not only 
appointed the executive directors, but also had to monitor strategic management 
decisions. Having supervisory board seats could give a bank information about and 
possibly control over companies' managers.26 This made banks more willing to 
provide external fmance. Moreover, through supervisory board representation large 
banks could play a role in the rationalisation of industries by organising mergers and 
cartels. Furthermore, banks' supervisory board representatives could help to improve 
the exchange of information, thereby contributing to a more efficient allocation of 
investment flows.27 
Opposition to the idea ofthe prominent role of banking in German industrial 
development has mainly focused on the period after 1900. The merits of big banks in 
providing funds for initial industrialisation are usually not denied, but the continuing 
dominance of big banking is. As to investments, Edwards and Ogilvie have stressed 
that the Grossbanken were mainly involved in dealing with joint-stock companies and 
that by 1913 these accounted for only 17% of the total industrial capital stock?8 
24 J. Kocka, op. cic., p . 90. 
2S J. Edwards and S. Ogilvi e, op.ciC. , p.430. 
26 J. Kocka, op. cic., p .91. 
21 J . Edwards and S.Ogilvie, op.ciC., pp.430-31. 
28 Ibid., p.436. 
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Moreover, the concentration process in the heavy industries itselfresulted in firms 
requiring amounts of capital that exceeded the supply capacity of any single big banIe 
Internal financing increased and big banks were not able to secure previously 
exclusive relationships with fmns .29 With regard to supervisory board representation, 
this meant that more than one big bank came to be represented on the supervisory 
board of a single firm. 
In addition it has been claimed that the accumulation of large numbers of supervisory 
board seats by individual bank directors had a negative effect on their ability to 
influence management decisions, since they came to lack both time and detailed 
knowledge of the companies they had to monitor.30 
1.3 Bank-industry relations in Germany: the Weimar period 
Prior to the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929 two phases are usually 
distinguished in the economic history of the Weimar Republic. The period 1919-1923 
was a period of inflation and hyperinflation, the period 1925-1929 one of stabilisation. 
At the beginning of the first period there were eight metropolitan big banks. As a 
result of war, inflation, government deficit spending and abundant central bank credit, 
liquidity increased up to 1923 and this tended to weaken big bank involvement in the 
fmance of industry. 31 A major activity of the Great Banks threatened to become 
unproductive paperwork, which inflation generated and resulted in the expansion of 
staff. Moreover, some of the larger industrial companies tried to bypass big banks by 
setting up their own house banks. Partly as a reaction to these developments the Great 
29 Ibid., p.440. 
30 H. James, The Gennan Slump. Politics and Economics , 1924-1936 (Oxford, 
1987) ,p.143 . 
31 G. Hardach, 'Banking and industry in Germany in the interwar period, 1919-
1939 ' , Journal of European Economic History XIII (1984) p.206. 
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Banks expanded their regional networks, by turning affiliated provincial banks into 
branches directly dependent upon the big Berlin banks. By generating regional funds 
more efficiently the Great Banks sought to regain strength vis-a-vis the industrial 
sector.32 
The Deutsche Bank, for example, expanded its provincial banking network through 
capital share increases and fusion. In 1920 Deutsche Bank gained control over the 
Hildesheimer Bank by means of a major exchange of shares; and in 1921, Deutsche 
Bank increased its permanent share holdings in the Rheinische Creditbank. In these 
cases presence of a Deutsche Bank director on the supervisory board was a visible 
expression of dominance. In other cases, like that of the Wurttembergische 
Vereinsbank and the Siegener Bank, control was secured by direct take over.33 
In 1924 the currency was stabilised and in subsequent years the credit poLicy of the 
German Central bank, the Reichsbank, became more restrictive. The big Berlin banks 
increased their short-term foreign borrowing in order to circumvent this policy. 
Together with the foreign borrowing of non-banking sectors the big banks 
accumulated a large short-term foreign debt (of about 8 milliard RM by 1930) which 
potentially could force Germany off the gold standard in case of a currency crisis. 
Moreover, the liquidity ratio (cash and central bank deposits to creditors) in 
commercial banking as a whole had declined from about 7.3% in 1913 to 3.8% in 
1929. All this made the German banking system extremely vulnerable should a crisis 
occur.
34 
32 Ibid., p.206. 
33 G. Feldrnan, 'The Deutsche Bank in the Weimar period'. The Deutsche Bank, 
1870-1995 , L . Gall e . a. ed. (1995), pp . 1 74 - 178. 
34 G . Hardach, op . cit ., pp . 214 - 215. 
lO 
After the government had managed to stabilise the currency, the organisational 
expansion ofthe big banks came to a halt and employment was reduced drastically.35 
In contrast to this, domestic bank lending expanded after 1924. But the way the Great 
Banks distributed credit has led authors like James, to accuse the Great Banks of 
'conservatism' in their investment policies.36 As before the First World War the Great 
banks did mainly lend to large finns. 76% of Great Bank loans was over 100.000 RM 
in 1928. And, like before, the great banks mainly supported heavy industry sectors like 
coal mining, iron and steel and traditional industries like breweries and textiles. 37 
Within the heavy industry sectors the second half of the 1920s saw a series of mergers 
and combinations, which created huge conglomerates. The Great Banks themselves 
followed this trend quite late. The most important bank merger took place in 1929, 
when Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschajt merged.38 This created the largest 
bank in Germany (nom. share capital: 285 mill. RM) However, this giant bank still 
looked small in comparison to giant industrial concerns like the chemical 
conglomerate 1. G.Farben (nom. share capital : 1100 mill. RM) and the steel giant 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke (nom. share capital: 800 mill. RM).39 
In 193 1, two years after the Great Depression set in, a banking crisis occurred which 
led to the collapse of the system as it had functioned from 1870 on. The DANAT-Bank, 
one of the Great Banks, had invested heavily in the Norddeutsche Wollkammerei, a 
textile firm. When this firm defaulted in 1931 the DANAT-Bank incurred enormous 
losses. Moreover, the unstable situation during the depression had resulted in 
35 G. Fe l dman, op.cit., p . 209. 
36 H . James, op.cit., pp.141-143. 
37 Ibid., p.142. 
38 G. Feldman, op. ci t . , p . 230 . 
39 Wirtschaft und Statistik, Statistisches Reichsamt ed. (Berlin, 1930), p. 
14. 
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increased runs on bank deposits and by July 1931 the DANAThad itself become 
insolvent.4o The Reichsbank, constrained by its commitment to defend the currency 
could not act as a lender oflast resort and a general banking crisis followed. 41 This, 
however, was not, as Hilferding might have thought, the beginning of a transition from 
capitalism to socialism, since two years later socialism was banned and the state was 
taken over by the nazi-party. Although some factions within the nazi-party wanted to 
get rid of the Great Banks altogether, the party leaders judged the Great Banks to be 
vital for the functioning of the economy and in 1936 fully re-privatised the Great 
Banks.42 
2. Supervisory board representation: hypotheses, data, sources 
2.1 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the reviews of discussion given above, I will now outline how 
information on supervisory board representation has been used by others, and will be 
used by me in order to shed light on some of the problems noted in the summaries of 
discussion presented in the first chapter. Four issues will be addressed. To start with, I 
will discuss how supervisory board material can be used to test Hilferding's prediction 
about the growth of bank involvement across industries. Next, the relationship 
between financial involvement of banks in industrial sectors and the sectoral spread of 
banks' supervisory board seats will be investigated. Finally, two topics mentioned in 
sections 1.2 and 1.3 of chapter I are dealt with: a) the use of supervisory board 
representation to maintain exclusive bank-firm relationships ; b) the accumulation of 
supervisory board seats by individual bank directors. 
40 G. Hardach, op.cit., p .220 . 
41 Ibid , p.223. 
42 Ibid . , p.230 . 
l 2 
2.1.1 First hypothesis: Hilferding on the extension of bank involvement across 
industrial sectors 
As noted earlier, Hilferding expected both a concentration within industries and a 
greater co-ordinating role of large banks across industries. The supervisory board 
material Hilferding himself used, however, doesn't tell us much about either of the two 
developments, since Hilferding draws upon a study Otto Jeidels performed in 1905, 
which only gives the total number of bank directors' seats in other flrms as compared 
to the total number of supervisory board seats.43 This type of study allows only for the 
conclusion that bankers had a lot of seats. For example, in the case of the Weimar 
Period it has been calculated that in 1928 bankers occupied 1300 supervisory board 
seats out of a total of 5800.44 
Studies on the cross-sectoral spread of supervisory board seats don't necessarily tell us 
anything about concentration within industries either, since only if concentration took 
the form of mergers (and not cartels) could the number of supervisory board seats 
banks held be expected to decline. The evolution of the cross-sectoral spread of banks' 
seats could, however, be used to say something about bank involvement across 
sectors. 
In my opinion, a cross-sectoral study allows for at least one of Hilferding's claims to 
be tested. If, as he expected, Great Bank involvement across sectors increased, after 
WWI one would expect the relative share of banks' supervisory board seats to shift 
away from the heavy industry sectors where bank-industry relations were quite close 
before 1914. The underlying assumption would be that the spread of supervisory 
board representation indicates something about bank activity in a sector. 
43 O.Jeide1s, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit 
besonderer BerUcksichtigung der Eisenindustrie (Leipzig. 1905) . 
44 G.Hardach, 'Banking and industry in Gennany in the interwar period, 1919-
1939', Journal of European Economic History XIII (1984), p. 218. 
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2.1.2 Second hypothesis: correlating the sectoral spread of supervisory board 
seats to sectoral financial activities of the Great Banks 
In order to ascertain whether the assumption that underlies the first hypothesis is valid, 
i.e. that there was is a positive correlation between the sectoral spread of supervisory 
board seats and Great Banks' fmancial involvement in sectors, the concept of financial 
involvement must be specified. 
Financial involvement of banks with industry mainly took three forms. First, banks 
supported firms by giving short- or long-term loans. Although a theoretical distinction 
between the two can be made (short-term loans covering production costs such as raw 
materials and semi-finished products, and long-term loans for replacing and renewing 
fixed capital), the practice of German Banks to continuously extend short-term credits 
made the distinction between short- and long-term credit less rigid.45 Second, banks 
issued shares on behalf of companies, receiving a compensation for floating new 
shares.46 Finally, banks could purchase company shares themselves, thus acquiring 
voting rights in shareholders meetings. The banks could either exercise shareholders' 
rights for themselves or on behalf of other parties (although available sources seldom 
allow one to determine which shares were held for which purpose).47 It is usually 
maintained that after the negative experience of the 1870s, the Great Banks refrained 
from funding companies by holding large amounts of shares themselves.48 
As for the second and third forms of fmancial involvement mentioned, it is sometimes 
possible to obtain information from individual company records. The construction of a 
45 H. Wixforth, Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik (Koln , 
1995), p.15. 
46 Ibid . , p . 18 . 
4 7 Ibid . , p . 57. 
48 J. Edwards and S. Ogilvie, 'Universal banks and German industrialisation: a 
reappraisal' , Economic History Review XLIX 3 (1996), p . 429 . 
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detailed picture of the sectoral spread of the Great Banks' share issuing activities and 
shareholdings has however not been undertaken to my knowledge, and to do so would 
be to go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Useful information is however available 
for bank loans (See section 3.2.1) The supervisory board data will therefore be 
compared with data on bank loans, the latter serving as a (incomplete) measure of 
fmancial involvement of the Great Banks in industry. 
One would expect to find a positive correlation between the sectoral spread of the 
Great Banks' supervisory board seats and financial involvement of the Great Banks in 
different sectors. Such a relationship is however not necessarily an indication of bank 
influence. To get some idea about the relationship between financial support and 
influence, a closer look will be taken at the case of the biggest of the Great Banks in 
the 1920s, the Deutsche Bank. 
2.1.3 Third hypothesis: supervisory board representation and the decline of 
exclusive bank-firm relations 
The point about bank influence is to be further elaborated upon, when looking at a 
third topic: the use of supervisory board positions to maintain exclusive relationships 
between banks and firms. The study of exclusivity relationships between Great Banks 
and individual firms will be limited to the five sectors where Great Bank directors on 
average had most supervisory board seats (coal mining, metal industry, machinery & 
railway equipment, electricity and banking). The fact of more than one Great Bank 
having a seat on the supervisory board of a particular firm, is sometimes seen as 
indicating that the influence of individual banks declined and competition between the 
Great Banks increased.49 
49 Ibid., p.440. 
15 
The problem with this assumption is that, although it may be correct to link more 
banks being represented on the board ofthe same firm to declining influence of 
individual banks, the position of the Great Banks as a group vis-a-vis a ftrm might 
compensate for this, provided the banks co-operated. If therefore the data show an 
increase in the number of ftrms, where more than one Great Bank had a supervisory 
board seat, this will be interpreted as conftrming the hypothesis of decreased influence 
of individual banks, but not of Great Bank-influence as a group. 
2.1.4 Fourth hypothesis: supervisory board seat accumulation and firm 
monitoring 
The accumulation of supervisory board seats by individual Great Bank directors has 
been viewed as detrimental to their capacity to monitor flrtns adequately. This claim is 
usually only substantiated by pointing out that some directors had many seats.50 Little 
attention however is given to the possibility that individual directors with many 
supervisory board seats could monitor more effectively through specialisation. If most 
supervisory board seats of Great Bank directors with many seats were mainly located 
in few sectors, accumulation of seats might not have damaged directors' capacity to 
monitor fmns. This 'specialisation' hypothesis will be investigated fust by compiling 
top-ten lists of bank directors with most supervisory board seats and subsequently by 
looking at the sectoral composition of seats. 
2.2 Data and sources 
The data used for studying the four issues mentioned above have been taken primarily 
from Sating's Borsenpapiere. This compendium offlrtns listed on German stock 
markets gives the names of members of companies' supervisory boards. Information 
50 G. Feldman, 'Banks and the problem of capital shortage in Germany, 1918-
1923', The role of banks in the interwar economy, H. James ed. (Cambridge, 
1991), p. 52. 
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was gathered on supervisory board seats in other companies held by the directors of 
the main Great Banks in 1921 (Deutsche Bank, Disconto-Gesellschajt, Berliner 
Handelsgesellschajt, Darmstadter Bankf Hand. u. Ind. , Nationalbankf Deutschland, 
Dresdner Bank, Commerz u. Privatbank, Mitteldeutsche Creditbanks1) for the years 
1921, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929 and 1930. The sectoral classification offll1Tls adopted is 
the same as in Saling's Borsenpapiere. 
To my knowledge, the two most elaborate studies on the cross-sectoral spread of the 
supervisory board seats of the Great Banks were both done prior to WWll. Riesser 
(1912) has looked at the year 191 2 and Hanemann (1931) at 1927.52 When comparing 
these two studies, one gets the impression that Great Banks' seats remained largely 
confined to the heavy industry sectors, but comparison is dangerous for two reasons. 
First, Riesser looked at six of the Great Banks53 , not all of which were in the group of 
seven Great Banks studied by Hanemann in 1927. Second, for some banks Riesser 
only looks at the seats directors of the Great Banks held in other companies; but for 
other banks Riesser looks at the seats held in other companies, both of directors and of 
members of the supervisory boards of the Great Banks.54 Hanemann, only takes the 
second approach. 
51 In the course of this period t hree mergers took place between these banks . 
52 
In 1921 t he Da nnscadcer and t he Nationalbank merged to become the DANAT-
Bank. 1929 saw mergers between t h e Miccel deucsche Creditbank, which became 
part o f t he Commerzbank, and, as noted earl i er, the Deutsche Bank and the 
Disconco-Gesellschatc. 
J . Riesser, Die deucschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzencracion im 
zusammenwirkung der Gesamtwircschafc in Deutschland (Jena, 1912); W. 
Hanemann, Das verhal cnis der deucschen Grossbanken zur Induscrie (Berlin, 
1931) . 
53 See: Riesser, op.cic., pp.651-672 and W. Hanemann, op.cic., p . 79. 
54 J. Riesser, op.cit., pp. 661-662. 
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As for my own research, I have only collected data for Great Bank directors. There 
was a practical reason for doing this: limiting the scope of research. The total number 
of seats collected for the six years mentioned already amounts to 3850. A theoretical 
reason for just considering the directors, however, is that one might argue, that 
directors of a Great Bank were likely to be more important than the supervisory board 
members of a Great Bank in matters of monitoring on behalf of the bank. 
3. Results 
3.1 The sectoral spread of Great Bank directors' supervisory board seats 
3.1.1 Aggregated Results 
The first hypothesis (Le. on the basis of Hilferding's prediction assuming that the 
relative share of supervisory board seats of Great Bank directors located in traditional 
heavy industry sectors would decline) has been tested both by looking at the sectoral 
spread of the Great Banks as a group and by investigating individual Great Banks. 
First, the number of Great Bank directors' supervisory board seats per sector was 
calculated for three years, covering the beginning, middle and end of the period under 
investigation (1921, 1925 and 1930). Next graphs of the percentage of directors' seats 
held in each sector were constructed for all three years and these were superimposed. 
If the graphs showed similar patterns and did not cross each other frequently, this 
could be interpreted as a sign of little change in the sectoral spread of Great Bank 
directors' supervisory board seats in the 1920s. Such a result would not be consistent 
with Hilferdings' idea of an expansion of Great Bank activity across sectors. 
In figure I the results of the aggregated series (Le. all Great Banks taken together) are 
reported. The sectoral percentages are supervisory board seats of all Grossbank-
directors in a particular sector, as a percentage of the total number of directors' seats in 
a given year. From figure I it can be observed, that the graph lines for 1921, 1925 and 
1 8 
1930 follow very similar patterns and hardly cross each other. This points to very little 
change in relative shares of sectors between 1921 and 1930. There are five sectors, 
where all peaks are above the 7% line (coal mining & metal ovens, metal industry, 
machinery & railway equipment, electricity and banking) and a sixth sector, textiles, 
with peaks for 1925 and 1930 nearing 5%. In the top five (seat% > 7%) four out of 
five are heavy industry sectors. The results therefore, show that heavy industry sectors 
were initially and remained the sectors were most supervisory board seats of Great 
Bank directors were located. The observed lack of change could be seen as evidence 
that complements James' idea of Great bank 'conservatism' in their investment policies 
(see: section 1.3), 'conservatism' meaning that the Great Banks remained most active 
in those sectors where they already were active. By contrast, the results do not favour 
Hilferdings' hypothesis of an expansion of Great Bank involvement outside the 
industries where they were traditionally active. 
In order to get an idea of how exactly important the five most-seat sectors were during 
the 1920s. Table I gives a more detailed view of developments in the five top sectors. 
Taking the sum of seats in the five top sectors as a percentage of the total number of 
seats for all banks for 1920, 1925 and 1930, shows that during the whole period the 
five top sectors alone accounted for well over 50% of all supervisory seats held by 
directors of the Great Banks. So, overall the traditional heavy industry sectors (coal 
mining, metal, machinery and electricity) plus banking continued to absorb most of 
the supervisory seats of Great Bank directors, contrary to what one would expect on 
the basis of Hilferdings' assumptions. 
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1921 1925 1930 
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1. CO.Mi. & Metal ol.€ns 111 19,6 134 I 19,03 107 19 
12. Salt, Kali & Bas. Min. 14 2,5 18 2,6 14 I 2,5 
13. Petroleum 2 0,35 2 ! 0,3 3 0,5 
4. Metal Industry 53 I 9,3 57 8,1 50 8,9 
:So Mach.& Railway Eq. 55 I 9,7 85 12,1 48 8,5 ._ 
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[15. Constr. Materials 9 1,6 10 1,4 13 i_.~~· 
116.POrceTain- --- 6 1,1 11 1,6 11 ! 1,9 
'w. Sugar .- 3 0,5 9 1,3 6 --1,1 
"18.sreWerieS&Sj)fritS---:r6- - ,- "2,8 .--~- --2;9- ~ 16 .. 2,8 
.!~. Shi~~i~~.:!:r~n~p'?'~ __ ....!.~_~ 15 I 2,1 13 2,3._ 
20. Railways 14 2,5 10 1,4 8 1,4 
:21."fr:8ri1w-:&,Bus·con-liJ -- 12 : 2,1 7 L 0,99 .. _ 7 - 1 ,2 - '" 
22. Banking 73 ! 12,9 91 ! 12,9 62 11 
23. Insurance -- 27 i 4,8 32 4,5 29 5,2 --
24. Foreign Enterprise 30 5,3 ·1-"20 '--'''2,8-- -- 13 - 2,3' 
25. Dil.€rse Industries 9 I 1,6 21 2,9 31 '-'5;5'--
Total 567 ! 100 704 100 563 100 
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However, it can also be observed in table I, that there is a rising trend up to 1925 and 
a decline afterwards, both in the absolute number of seats held by all Great Banks and 
in the total of the five sectors. As far as percentages are concerned the peak lies in 
1927. Looking at the movement of total number of seats for each of the five top 
sectors individually in the latter half of table I, two (machinery & railway equipment 
and electricity) follow the trend of the aggregated sectors (rise and decline, with peak 
in 1925) exactly. In the other sectors movement is more erratic (coal min. and metal 
industry) or the peak is earlier (banking, peak: 1923). But the overall trend of an 
expansion of supervisory board seats in the five top sectors during the inflationary 
period and a contraction during the stabilisation period, is confirmed. 
Ta b le 1 
Sum sectors' 
192 1 340 
1923 
---
414 
1925 426 
-- --
1927 420 
+ -- -- - -
1929 373 
1930 317 
Sectors wit!1. ~v~ ~~~t perce nlag e ber ~ank> 7% 
Total all Banks 
567 
--- 687 -- --
563 _ _ f--- _ 
% 
59 ,9 
60~ -
--
• Coal min ing & Mel ovens + Metallnd . + Mach & Railway Eq . + Electricity + Banking 
Co .Mi.Met.Ov . Metallnd . Mach .&Rw .Eq. Electricity Banking 
nO .seats (%)" nO.seats (%) nO .seats (%) nO .seals (%) nO .seats (%) 
1921 111 (19.6) 53 (9 .3) 55 (9.7) 48 (8.5) 73 (12.8) 
1923 138 (20.1) 53 (7 .7) 76 (11 .1) 
-
54 (7 .9) 93 t1 3 . ~) 
-- - - 134 (19:0) 1- - §?(8-. 1) _ -85(12.1) 59 (8-.4) 1925 
-
91 (12 .9) 
192-7 138(20.2) 60 (8 .8) 79(115) 57(83) 86 (126) 
1929 112 (17.4) 63 (9 .8) 58 (8 .9) 58 (8 .9) 82 (12 .7) 
--
1930 1{7(19) - 50 (89) 48 (8':5) 50 (89) 62 (110) 
•• P~nlages~re of total all banks __ [Saling's Borsenpapiere , VOIS . . ~1..." 1923 
I 1925 , 1927 , 1929 , 1930J I 
The contraction in the number of supervisory board seats during the stabilisation 
period was probably linked to the merger wave both in the heavy industry sectors and 
in banking itself, which reduced the total number of seats available in each sector. As 
for the expansion of seats during the inflationary period, it is more difficult to provide 
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a satisfactory explanation. For the banking sector itself it is known that the expansion 
of the Great Banks' regional networks started in the inflationary period, and that the 
Great Banks acquired other banks which stayed independent in name only.55 Great 
Bank directors may have required seats on the supervisory boards of those banks, 
which were eliminated during the merger wave of the late twenties. As for the heavy 
industry sectors, however, these are seen as having gained greater independence from 
the Great Banks during the inflationary period because of alternative credit sources 
(see: section 1.3), so it is unlikely that the expansion of Great Bank directors' 
supervisory board seats had anything to do with Great Banks expanding their leverage 
over industrial companies. 
3.1.2 Individual Great Banks 
The group analysis can be complemented with a study of individual Grossbanken. In 
these cases sectoral seat percentages are of the total number of seats of an individual 
Great Bank. Other than that, the testing procedure is as described in at the beginning 
of section 3.1.1. Graphs for individual Grossbanken show sectoral percentages of 
directors' seats for all sectors in 1921 , 1925 and 1930 respectively. As examples, the 
results for two banks, one with little variation, the Deutsche Bank (fig. 2) and one with 
more variation, the Commerz u. Privatbank (fig. 3), are reported. Both banks merged 
with another Great Bank in 1929 (Deutsche Bank with Disconto-GesellschaJt; 
Commerz. u. Privatbank with Mitteldeutsche Credit bank). 
In figure 2 it can be observed that in spite of the merger with DiscontogesellschaJt, 
sectoral percentages of supervisory board seats of Deutsche Bank directors changed 
very little between 1921 and 1930, as the 1930-line doesn't diverge much from the 
1921- and 1925-lines. The sequence of sectors is the same as in figure I. The sectors 
marked out by their high peaks (1 ,4,5,8 and 22) are the five top sectors where directors 
55 G. Hardach, 'Banking and industry in Germany in the interwar period , 1919-
1939', Journal of European Economic History XIII (1984). pp.206 - 207 . 
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had more than 7 % of their supervisory boards seats. As in table I most directors had 
their seats the coal mining, metal, machinery, electricity and banking sectors during 
the whole period. The insurance and foreign enterprise sectors (23, 24) each account 
for about 8% of directors' supervisory board seats in 1921, but in 1925 and 1930 the 
figures have dropped to 5% and 3% respectively. The textile sector (11) constantly has 
a share of about 5% of the supervisory board seats of Deutsche Bank directors. 
Figure 3 shows the results for the Commerz u. Privatbank. The patterns of the 1921 , 
1925 and 1930 lines follow each other less closely. Although there are still the usual 
peaks for the five top sectors, sometimes there are also more unusual peaks, like the 
chemical sector (7) in 1925 and the construction materials sector (15) in 1930. In the 
latter case the change could be due to the merger with the Milteldeutsche Credit bank 
in 1929, as it is the I 930-line, which has the highest peak, but in the case of chemicals 
the highest peak is in 1925, i.e. before the merger. 
Overall, the cases of the Deutsche Bank and the Commerz u. Privatbank confirm the 
results of the aggregated study in figure I. Supervisory board seats of directors of these 
two banks were predominantly located in four heavy industry sectors (coal mining, 
metal, railway and machinery equipment, electricity) and in the banking sector during 
the 1920s, and no major shift in seats away from these sectors occurred. Again, this 
result appears to weaken Hilferding's hypothesis of a an expansion of Great Bank 
activity outside the sectors where they traditionally active. The results of the sectoral 
study of Great Bank directors' supervisory board seats, would gain weight, however, if 
a link between the sectoral spread of bank directors ' supervisory board seats the 
financial involvement of banks in different sectors could be established. The next 
section is be devoted to this topic. 
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3.2 The correlation between the spread of Great Bank loans and directors' 
supervisory board seats 
3.2.1 Sectoral loans and supervisory board seats 
The results so far suggest that the directors of the Grossbanken had the majority of 
their supervisory board seats in four heavy industry sectors plus banking. It makes 
more sense to use this fmding against Hilferding's theory of increased bank 
involvement across sectors, if a link between the sectoral concentration of supervisory 
board seats and sectoral, financial activity of banks could be established. The second 
hypothesis assumes a positive correlation between the sectoral spread of Great Bank 
directors' supervisory board seats and financial involvement ofthe Great Banks in 
certain sectors. One should, however, not assume the correlation to be perfect, since 
shifts in the sectorallocation of bank directors' supervisory board seats may have a 
different dynamic from shifts of financial resources between sectors. Certainly, one 
would expect the shift of supervisory board seats to be a fairly slow process, compared 
to sectoral shifts in short-term bank loans for example. Since the loan data which were 
available, did not allow for a separation between short- and long-term loans this might 
afffect results. On the other hand, it was noted, that German banks often provided 
short-term loans on such a basis, that they effectively became long-term loans (see: 
sect. 2.1.2). 
Sectoral data on aggregate bank loans between 1925-1828 of all Grossbanken quoted 
by Hanemann were compared to the sectoral shares of supervisory board seats of all 
Grossbanken. In table II domestic loan figures are placed next to foreign loan figures , 
which Hanemann also collected, in order to illustrate that during the stabil isation 
period (1925-1929) direct, short-term foreign borrowing became more important than 
domestic borrowing. This weakened the position of the Great Banks vis-a-vis industry, 
notably in sectors like coal mining & metal ovens. The chemical sector appears to be 
the exception, domestic loans exceeding foreign loans. This should however not be 
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seen as an indicator of strength of the Great Banks, since already before WWI the 
chemical sector had become independent of the Grossbanken. This independence 
became even more marked in 1924 when 1. G. Farben was created, remaining by far 
the largest firm in Germany during the 1920s.56 
Hanemann only gives data for twelve sectors. These include the four heavy industry 
sectors where Great Banks directors had most of their supervisory board seats located 
and other important sectors like textiles and breweries, but banking is excluded. In 
table III sectoral seat percentages for 1925 and 1927 were recalculated with respect to 
the total number of supervisory board seats in the twelve sectors loan data were 
available for. Comparing the pattern of sectoral percentages of seats and loans in 
figure 4 shows that loan and seat patterns were not very dissimilar, with the big 
exception of chemicals, where Great Bank directors had relatively few seats but 
nevertheless provided a lot ofloan support. 
56 Wirtschaft und Sta t isti k, S t a t ist i sches Reichsamt ed. (Berlin, 1 929), p. 
172 . 
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TABLE 11 Great Bank loans to sectors 
1925-1928 1924-1928 
Dom. Lns.* % For. Lns. % 
Sectors ('000 RM) ('000 RM) 
Coal Min. & Met. ovens 266400 39,4 999435 43,2 
Salt, Kali , Basalt min. 270000 11,7 
Metal industry 36400 4,5 17040 0,7 
Machinery & Railw. eq. 59900 7,4 29400 1,27 
Chemicals 277100 34,2 44940 1,94 
Electricity 55000 6,8 756570 32,7 
Gumrri/Linoleum 37500 4,6 
Textiles 16000 1,9 28950 1,25 
Paper 8000 0,9 39420 1,7 
Construction materials 4600 0,6 
Glas/porcellain 3300 0,4 9660 0,42 
Sugar 1800 0,2 
Breweries and spirits 44450 5,5 
Shipping Transport 117600 5,1 
Total 810450 100 2313015 100 
*Provided by all Grossbanken 
(Source: Hanemann, Das Verhaltnis, pp.33-35) 
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As expected, correlating sectoral seat and domestic loan percentages gives a positive 
result (0.59). If one leaves out the chemical sector the correlation is even higher 
(0.87). Moreover, the fact that sectoral seat percentages for all Grossbanken hardly 
moved between 1925 and 1927, ensures almost identical results no matter which year 
is used to correlate sectoral seat percentages with domestic sectoralloans. 
Finding a positive correlation between the sectoral spread of Great Bank directors' 
supervisory board seats and the sectoral spread ofloans issued by the Great Banks, 
strengthens the conclusion of the previous section. Both the loan data and the 
supervisory board data point to Great Banks remaining most active in the heavy 
industry sectors they traditionally were most involved with. This involvement should 
however not be confused with influence, as the next section intends to make clear. 
3.2.2 Did loans give influence? The case of the Deutsche Bank 
Sectoral differences in the spread of loans do not tell us, whether Great Banks had 
more influence in some sectors than in others. As will be shown below, loans were 
only one of the means that potentially could, but not always did give a Great Banks 
leverage over firms . Hanemann suggests that in heavy industry sectors such as coal 
mining, metal and electricity, where large firms requiring enormous amounts of 
capital were predominant, the Great Banks had little influences7 ; only in sectors like 
machinery and railway equipment, where a lot of medium sized firms were active, the 
Grossbanken allegedly were able to exert pressure on management.S8 Generalisation 
on the sectorallevel, however, is often problematic, given the difficulties which 
already arise, if one studies the relationships between individual banks and firms, as a 
57 W. Hanemann , Das Verha l tnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Indus t rie, pp. 89 
a nd 115 . 
58 Ibid., p.124. 
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recent study by Wixforth on the relationship between the Great Banks and a number of 
coal mining and steel firms during the 1920s reveals. 59 If one studies the fmancial 
links between Great Banks and industry, besides information ~'om armual reports, one 
needs to consult archival firm records in order to get a somewhat reliable picture about 
who was dominating whom.60 
An analysis of the relationship between individual firms and individual Great Banks, 
however, can provide some insight into the question of influence. Factors like loan 
provision, stock issuing activity and share holdings, the relative size of a bank with 
respect to an industrial firm, and the historical links between banks and firms, all 
appear to have shaped ofbank-fmn relations. The significance of supervisory board 
positions of Great Bank directors (merely decorative, or expressing of real leverage) 
differed according to how these factors operated. The examples of the Deutsche 
Banks' relationship with particular fmns given below are in no way comprehensive, 
but intend to illustrate how the factors mentioned above could vary from case to case. 
An example of a situation in which size seems to have clearly mattered, is that of the 
coal mining and steel firm Vereinigte Stahlwerke, in terms of nominal share capital 
(800 million RM) the second largest fmn in Germany by 1927. This giant trust, 
created in 1926, comprised other coal mining and steel firms that were independent in 
name only, like the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G., the Rheinische Stahlwerken, the 
Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergw. u. Hut/en A.G., the Bochumer Vereinf Bergb. u. 
Gusstahl-fabrikation and the Ver. Stahlwerken vd Zypen.6J Deutsche Bank directors 
had seats on the supervisory boards of all these firms as well as on the supervisory 
board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke itself. Deutsche Bank's links with the fmns 
59 H. Wixf o r t h, Bank en un d Schweri ndus trie in der Wei marer Republik (Koln, 
1995), p . 5 1 1. 
60 Ibid. , pp . 7-8 and 54 - 5 8. 
61 W. Hanemann, op.cic ., pp.87-88 . 
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comprising the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, did stem the pre-WWI period when Deutsche 
Bank had supported their growth. 
During the 1920s, however, neither having supervisory board seats nor providing 
loans to the Vereinigte Stahlwerke gave Delltsche Bank any leverage over the giant 
steel trust.The founding companies of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke possessed about 660 
Million RM of its share capital, whereas Great Banks like the Deutsche Bank and the 
DANAT-Bank had 36 and 38 Million RM worth of shares respectively.62 Although the 
Deutsche Bank did provide loan credit, the amounts of capital the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke required were simply to big for one Great Bank to supply. For example, 
the Deutsche Bank had to form a consortium with the other D-Banks (Disconto-
GesellschaJt, DANAT-Bank and Dresdner Bank) in order to raise a 150 million RM 
loan for the Vereinigte Stahlwerke in 1926. But even this was not enough, since the 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke could afford to bypass the German consortium in 1927, in 
favour of a larger foreign loan offered in the United States.63 
In other cases, however, historical links had secured bank continuing influence in the 
affairs of a large firm. Mannesmannrohren, a steel company, was one of those firms 
where Deutsche Bank had been involved heavily before WWI, both in the area of 
stock issues and in organisational restructuring, in order to increase the firm's 
profItability.64 The success of the pre-WWI re-structuration led to Mannesmahnrohren 
becoming the eigth largest firm in Germany in terms of nominal share capital (160 
million RM). However, the main difference with other firms Delltsche Bank had 
supported before WWI, was that it had remained Mannesmannrohrens ' main share 
holder, possessing over one third of the firm's stock. The Deutsche Bank directors 
62 H. Wixiorth, op .ci t " p . 481. 
63 G. Feldman , 'The Deutsche Bank i n the We i mar period' , The De utsche Bank , 
1870 - 1995 , p . 209. 
64 Ibid . , p . 40 -41 . 
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were able to influence the firm's affairs through their supervisory positions. Wixforth 
remarks, that the status of director M. Steintahl, who was the main representative of 
Deutsche Bank on the supervisory board of Mannesmahnrohren during the 1920s, was 
such that "the executive board considered the supervisory board not so much as having 
a controlling role, but more as a help to resolve management problems.,,65 So, in spite 
of the fact that as a provider of loan credit the Deutsche Bank did not have an 
dominant role, its position as the main share holder of Mannesmahnrohren enabled the 
bank to influence the fmns' management.66 
An example of exercising influence through loan credits can be found in the 
machinery & railway equipment sector. During the 1920s Deutsche Bank became 
seriously involved in the affairs of car manufacturing companies Daimler and Benz, 
hoping the two would become leaders in a new mass-industry able to compete with 
US car-manufacturing rivals like Ford.67 In the early 1920s when Daimler and Benz 
had not fused yet, Deutsche Bank had links with the two companies through banks it 
controlled: the Rheinische Creditbank (providing credit to Benz) and the 
Wurttembergische Vereinsbank (supporting Daimler). The director of the Rheinische 
Creditbank, Dr. Jahr, was the main promotor of a fusion between Daimler and Benz. 
In 1926 fusion took place and Deutsche Bank director E.G. von Stauss became 
chairman of the supervisory board of the new company. Von Stauss exerted pressure 
on the management of the company to reorganise production and the use oflabour, a 
task complicated by labour resistance to rapid technological innovation.68 
65 H. Wixforth, op.cit., pp. 301-304. 
66 Ibid., p. 304. 
67 G .Feldman, op.cit . , p .2 14 . 
68 Ibid., p. 21S. 
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As these examples of Deutsche Bank's relationships with different firms show, loans 
could but did not necessarily give a Great Bank a say in managing a firm's affairs. In 
the case of medium- and small sized firms loans seem to have been a more effective 
way for a Great Bank to gain leverage, than in the case of large finns . The capital 
requirements of large finns had simply become too huge by the 1920s for one Great 
Bank to supply. If however, as a result of historical ties a Great Bank had remained in 
possession ofthe majority of a large finn's shares, it could nevertheless exercise 
influence over a firm. In such cases supervisory board seats of bank directors were not 
merely decorative, but allowed for a real say in managing a firm's affairs. 
3.3 The decline of exclusive bank-firm relations: sign of competition? 
As mentioned earlier (see: sections 1.2.2 and 2.1 .3), some authors have seen the 
presence of more than one Great Bank representative on the supervisory board of a 
frrm as evidence of decreasing influence of individual Great Banks and increased 
competition between Great Banks. In this section I will argue that there is evidence to 
sustain the fITst part of this hypothesis (i.e. the loss of exclusive bank-firm 
relationships), but that the confinnation of second part of the hypothesis (increased 
competition between Great Banks) does not necessarily follow from the confrrmation 
of the first part. 
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To test whether there was an increase in fIrms shared by the Great Banks, for the fIve 
sectors where most seats of Great Bank directors were located (see: section 3.1.1) the 
total number of companies per bank and the number of companies per bank, where at 
least one other Great Bank also held a supervisory board seat were calculated for the 
years 1921 , 1925 and 1930. Since patterns of change were quite similar in different 
sectors table IV only shows the results for the coal mining & metal ovens sector as a 
typical example. If one looks at the results of these calculations in table IV, the most 
obvious phenomenon is the repetition of the group pattern observed in table 1, that is a 
rise in the total number of companies and in the number of shared companies of all 
banks from 1921 to 1925 and a decline from 1925 to 1930. 
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Table IV Company overlap in seats: coal min. & metal ovens sector 
1921 no. of shared comp. * tot. no. of comp. p.b. % 
Deutsc:he Bank 9 17 52,9 
Disconto-Gesellschaft 12 20 60 
Berliner Handelsgesells. 14 18 77,8 
Darrrst.Bank f. H. u. Ind. 8 8 100 
Nat. Bank f. Deutschland 7 14 50 
Dresdner Bank 6 12 50 
Conrrerz u. Privatbank 5 9 55,6 
Mtteldeut. Creditbank 1 4 25 
Total 62 102 60,8 
, 
1925 no. of shared comp. tot. no of comp. p.b. % 
Deutsc:he Bank 18 22 81,8 
Disconto-Gesellschaft 16 22 72,7 
Berliner Handelsgesells. 15 16 93,7 
Darrrst. u. Nat. Bank** 19 24 79,2 
Dresdner Bank 15 16 93,7 
Conrrerz u. Privatbank 8 11 72,7 
Mtteldeut. Creditbank 2 8 25 
Total 93 119 78,2 
I 
1927 no. of shared comp. tot. no of comp. p.b. % 
Deut.Bank&Disc.Ges.*** 25 34 73,5 
Berliner Handelsgesells. 9 10 90 
Darrrst. u. Nat. Bank** 16 18 88,9 
Dresdner Bank 15 22 68,2 
Coom u. Privatbark**** 10 14 71,4 
Total 75 98 76,5 
*corrpanies v.klere at least one other Great Bank had a supervisory board seat 
** Darrrstadter Bank and Nationalbank merged in 1921 
*** Deutd1e Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft merged in 1929 
**** Comn Bank and Mtteldeutsc:he Creditbank merged in 1929 
[Source: Saling's 86rsenpapiere, Vols. 1921 , 1925, 1930] I I 
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Again, the decline after 1925 (increased merger activity during the stabilisation period 
within industrial sectors and between the Great Banks themselves) is easier to account 
for than the rise during the inflationary period. 
The number of shared companies as a percentage of total number of companies per 
bank is also reported in table IV. If one looks at the change in patterns over time, there 
is a rise in the percentage of shared companies of all banks from 1921 to 1925 and 
stability from 1925 to 1930 (patterns in the other top sectors are similar69). This 
appears to be consistent with the idea of a decreasing number of exclusive 
relationships between individual firms and individual Great Banks. 
Although one might be tempted to interpret the percentage figures as a measure of 
competition between the Great Banks (high % of shared companies indicating much 
competition) there is good reason not to do so. In the preceding section it was pointed 
out that if the Great Banks as a result of restructuring faced giant concerns (mostly in 
sectors like coal mining, metal industry and electricity) they had to form constortia for 
the provision of loans. If banks co-operated, higher percentages of shared seats could 
still indicate a diminishing influence of individual Great Banks, but no increase in 
competition between Great Banks. 
69 Percentages f o r 1921 , 192 5 a nd 1930 are a s fol l ows: Metal Ind. (51\ , 56 %, 
54%), Electric i ty (73.9%, 75 . 5%,75%), Mach. & Railw. Eq . (49%, 5 4%, 6 2% ), 
Banking (58%, 65%, 56%). Saling ' s Borsenpapiere, Vols. 1921, 1 925 , 1 930. 
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Feldman suggests that particularly in the case of the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto-
GesellschaJt the loan consortia formed in the second half of the 1920s were aimed at 
containing the breakdown in banking power.70 Oscar Schlitter, the Deutsche Bank 
director most actively pushing towards fusion with the Disconto-GesellschaJt, 
expressed the concern of the Great Banks as follows : "The concentration of capital in 
industry has taken on such dimensions and will go on further in such a way that the 
activity of the banks will be more and more pushed back and it will be made 
impossible for them to combat this suppression. In order to meet the challenge of 
industry, it is necessary to create a banking block of such dimensions that its 
placement capacity will dominate the domestic market and that underbidding of 
opposition groups which go beyond the bounds of the reasonable would be 
pointless.,,7l 
It should however be noted, that competition between the Great Banks did not 
disappear completely in the late 1920s, and also that at the highest level personal 
animosity could play a considerable role in maintaining competition. A notable 
example is the reaction of the older generation of bankers in the Deutsche Bank and 
the Disconto-GesellschaJt to the rise of Jakob Goldschmidt as the leading director of 
the DANAT-bank. People like Georg Solmssen (Disconto-GesellschaJt) and Oskar 
Wassermann (Deutsche Bank) disapproved of Goldschmidt's 'speculative past' before 
he became director of the DANAT-bank.72 (On the anecdotal level , James notes that 
according to the Dutch banker 1. Houwink ten Cate, Goldschmidt's speculative 
activities had permitted him to pursue an 'exuberant personal lifestyle' which shocked 
the Calvinistic burghers of Amsterdam73). As Solmrnsen was the key person to be 
convinced at the Disconto-GesellschaJt for opening up the prospect of fusion with one 
70 Ibi d ., p .23 0 . 
71 o. Schlit t e r quot e d in : G. Fe l dman, op.cit., p.232 . 
72 I bid., p. 231. 
73 H. J ames, The German Slump. Politics and Economics, 1924-1936, p.145. 
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of the other Great Banks, his view of Goldschmidt is said to have diminished the 
likelihood ofa fusion with theDANAT-Bank.74 
The simultaneous occurrence of competition and co-operation between the Great 
Banks noted above, makes the interpretation of the results of the percentage of shared 
companies in table IV more difficult, since if banks co-operated having more than one 
bank represented in a company might weaken individual Great Banks, but also 
strengthen the position of the Great Banks as a group. This might for example have 
been a tactic of the Great Banks vis-a-vis the steel giant Vereinigte Stahlwerke, where 
in 1927 five of the Great Banks had a supervisory board seat (Deut. Bank, Disc- Ges., 
DANAT-Bank, Dresdner 8., Ber!. Hand. Ges.) and only two Great Banks did not have 
a seat (Commerz. Bank and Mitteld. Creditbank).75 
In conclusion therefore, as far as the sectors where most of their directors ' supervisory 
board seats were located, are concerned, it seems that the Great Banks were less able 
to secure exclusive relationships with fums by exclusion of other Great Banks from a 
fum's supervisory board. This weakening of the position of individual Great Banks did 
however not always signify increased competition, as the banks themselves realised, 
they had to form a block in order to maintain their position versus some of the very 
large fIrms they worked with. 
74 G.Feldman, op.cit.,pp.231-232 . 
75 Saling's Borsenpapiere. Ein Handbuch fur Bankiers und Kapicalisten, E . 
Heinemann e . a. ed. (Berlin, 1927) p . 992. 
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3.4 Supervisory board seat accumulation, monitoring and specialisation 
As a final point, the composition of seats of directors with a lot seats was studied, in 
order to judge the claim that the accumulation of supervisory board seats by some 
directors of the Grossbanken diminished their capacity to monitor individual firms 
closely (see: section 2.1.4) Against this line of thinking one could argue that, if most 
supervisory board seats of Great Bank directors with many seats were mainly located 
in certain sectors, accumulation of seats might not have damaged directors' capacity to 
monitor firms. Moreover, concentration of a director's supervisory board seats might 
also indicate that a director took an active role in reorganising a sector, which would 
be consistent with Hilferding's theory. In order to test the hypothesis of a sectoral 
concentration of Great Bank director's supervisory board seats, first top-ten lists of 
bank directors with most supervisory board seats were compiled and subsequently the 
sectoral composition of seats was investigated. 
In tables V, VI.l and VI.2 lists of the ten directors with most seats in 1921 and 1930 
are reported. The first remarkable thing is the considerable personal continuity of 
directors with many supervisory board seats in the period 1921-1930. Seven out often 
people who were in the top ten in 1921 , were also in the top 10 in 1930. Furthermore, 
the persons listed were often leading figures amongst the directors of their banks, 
notably in the cases of O. Schlitter (Deutsche Bank), Gg. Solmssen and A. 
Salomonsohn (Disconto-Gesellschaft), H. Schacht and J. Goldschmidt (DANAT-
Bank). As to the latter two, Schacht left the DANAT-Bank to become president of the 
Reichsbank and Goldschmidt quickly became a dominant DANAT-director, 
accumulating many supervisory board seats. 
In table V it can be observed that with the exception of the amount of seats 
accumulated by Goldschmidt in 1930 (54 seats), the range of top-I 0 directors' seats in 
1921 was not very different from 1930, varying between 18 and about 40 seats per 
director. Comparing the number of seats occupied by top-I 0 directors to the total held 
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by all directors of a bank, shows that the many-seat-directors were often quite 
exceptional amongst their fellow directors. For example, Solmssen and Salomonsohn 
together held almost 50% of the supervisory board seats of the Disconto-GesellschaJt 
in 1921, leaving the division of the other 50% to the five remaining directors. The case 
of Goldschmidt in 1930 is even more remarkable, since he occupied 50% of the total 
number of seats of directors of the DANAT-Bank. If one adds to these the seats of S. 
Bodemheimer, the percentage of seats held by these two DANAT-directors becomes 
67.6%, leaving about 33% to divided amongst the remaining three directors. 
In tables VI. I and VI.2, one can see for 1921 and 1930 respectively, in which sectors 
top-l0 directors held most and in which they held second most number of seats. What 
strikes the observer at first, is that, with few exceptions, top-l 0 directors usually held 
most and second most seats in heavy industry sectors. Moreover, the two sectors 
where most of top-l 0 directors' seats were located, together at least accounted for 30% 
of a director's total, and often even 40% or 50%. Finally, if one looks at the seats top-
10 directors had in these sectors as a percentage of the bank's total in the sector, 
concentration again is often substantial. For example, O. Schlitter occupied 88.9% of 
the seats, directors of the Deutsche Bank had in the coal mining and metal ovens 
sector in 1921, i.e. 16 out of 18 seats. Carl Flirstenberg occupied all seats the directors 
ofthe Berliner HandelsgesellschaJt had in the metal industry in 1921. In 1930 J. 
Goldschmidt occupied about 79% of the seats DANAT-directors had in the coal mining 
sector. In the case of Goldschmidt it is known that he mediated actively between the 
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TABLE V Top 10 Directors 
-
no . 0 f se a ts no. of seats seat % no . of dir . 
1921 director a~ d lr .p .bnk per bank per b a nk 
1. Oscar Schlitter (Deutsche Ban k) 39 112 34,8 9 
2 . Carl FOrstenberg ( B erl. Handelsgesellschaft) 36 81 44 ,4 5 
·3. Dr . Gg . Solmssen ( D Isco ntogesellschaft) 28 115 24 ,3 7 
4 . Dr. A . Salomonsohn ( D Iscontogesellschaft ) 27 11 5 23 ,5 7 
5 . Dr . H . Schacht (Nat.bank fOr D eutschland) 26 69 37 ,7 5 
6. K . Sobernhei m (Comm . undo Prlvatbank) 25 75 33 ,3 "8 
7 . Dr. Gustav Sintenis (Berliner Handelsges .) 21 81 14 ,8 5 
8 . J . Goldschmldt (Nat.bank fOr Deu tsc hland ) 20 69 28,9 5 
-g. Otio Jeidels (Ber linger Handels gesellschaft ) 19 . 81 23,5 -"" ~ 5 
10 . H . Guttmann (Dresdner Bank) 18 4 7 38,3 7 
I ! I I -1930 , , 
1 . J . Goldschmidt (Darmst. und Nat.bank ) 54 108 50 5 
2 . 0 scar Schlitter (Deut.Bank & DIsc _Gesell .) 43 192 22,4 12 
3. K Sobernheim (Comm _ u . Pr lvatbank) 39 10-8 - 36,1 8 - -
4 _ H _ Nathan (Dresdner Bank ) 28 102 27,5 6 
5 . 0. Jeldels ( B erliner H andelsgesellschaft) 25 53 47 ,2 4 
- H. Guttmann (Dresdner Ban i<Y ·-·_· 25 102 24,5 - -6 -
7. Dr . Gg . Solmssen (Deut. Bank & Disc.Ges .) 24 192 12 ,5 12 
8 . Fr le dr lch Reinhart (Comm . u . Pr ivatbank) 22 108 20 ,4 8 
9. Dr . h .c . W ilh . Kleemann (0 resd fi-er""E1 an k) 19 102 18 ,6 -6 .. 
w. Kehl (Deut.Ban k & Disconto Gesell.) 19 192 9 ,9 12 
S. Bodenheimer (Darm st. u . Nationalbank ) 19 108 17 ,6 5 
G . Sintenis (Be rl iner H andelsgesellschaft) 19 53 35 ,8 4 
[Source : Saling's Bors.~npapiere, Vols . 1921, 1930] : i 
----- ---
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TABLE VI.I Top 10 Directors 1921 
I Most Seat Sector no . of seats % of tota I % of bank's 
d irector director total in sec . 
1 . Q s car S chi ille r (0 e u ts c he Ban k) Coal Min . & Met. Qv. 16 41 88 ,9 
2 . Carl FUrstenberg (Berl. Handelsgesellschaft) Coal Min . & Met. Qv . 10 27 ,8 47 ,6 
3 . Dr . Gg . Solmssen (Discon togesells chaft) E lectrici~y 6 21 ,4 50 
4 . Dr . A . Salomonsohn (Discontogesells chaft) Coal M in . & Met. Qv . 7 25 ,9 3 0 ,4 
5 . Dr. H . Schacht (Nat.bank fUr Deutschland) Coal Min . & Met. Qv. 6 23 , 1 40 
- -' 6 . K . Sobernheim (Comm . und Privatbank) Metall!1~stry 6 24 75 
7 . Dr. Gustav Sintenis (Berliner Handelsges .) Coal Min. & Met. Ov . 4 19 ,1 ~~" l 
8 . J . Goldschmidt (Nat.bank fUr Deu tschland ) Coal Min . & Met. Ov . 7 35 46,7 
9 . 0110 Jeidels ( Berl inger Handelsgesellschaft) Coal Min . & Mei . Cv . 4 21,1 19,1 
10 . H . Gullmann (Dresdner Bank) Coal Min. & Met. Ov . 6 33 ,3 50 
, 
I 
, 
Second most seat sector 
1 . Oscar Schliller (Deutsche Bank) Mach . & Railway eg o 5 12 ,8 45 ,? 
2 . Carl FUrstenberg (Berl. Handelsgesellschaft) Metall!1d_ustry 6 16 ,7 100 
3. Dr . Gg . Solmssen (Discontogesellschaft) Coal Min. & Met. OV . 5 17 , 9 21 ,? 
4 . Dr . A. Salomonsohn ( Discontogesellschaft) E lectricity 4 14 ,8 33 , 3 
5 . Dr . H . Schacht (Nat.bank fUr Deutschland) M etal Industry 5 19 ,2 50 
6 . K. Sobernheim (Comm . und Privatbank) Coa l Min. & Met. OV . 4 16 44 ,4 
7 . Dr. Gustav Sintenis (B erliner Handelsges .) Railways 2 9 ,5 100 
8 . J . Goldschmidt ( Na t.bank fUr Deuts chland) M etal Industry 3 15 30 
9 . 0110 Jeidels (Berlinger Handelsgesellschaft) Mach . & Railway eq , 3 15 ,8 37 ,5 
10 . H . Gullmann (Dresdner Bank) Banking 3 16 ,7 37 ,5 
[Source : Saling's Borsenpapiere , Vol. 1_921 J 
, i , 
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ITABLE VI.2 Top 10 Directors 1930 
Most S eat Sector I no .- 0TSeatS1 % _of t_otal I % of bank ~-
director direclOr total in sec . 
1. J. Goldschmidt (Darmst . und Nat.bank ) Coal Min. & Met. Ov. 15 27,8 
41 ,9 
78 ,9 
42,9 ' 2 . Oscar Schlitter (Deul.Bank & Disc .Gesell .) Coal Min. & Met. Ov. 18 
: 3. K Sobernheim (Comm . u . Privatbank) Metal Industry 7 
8 
7 
17 ,9 
28,6 
28 
53 ,8 
36 ,4 
70 
4. H .- Nathan (Dresdner Bank) Coal Min . & Mei . Ov. 
:5 . O . Jeidels (Berliner Handelsgesellschaft) Coal M in . & Met. Ov. 
H:""Guttmann (iSresdner-Bank )--- ----- Coal Min . & M~5v.I-
7. Dr . Gg. SOlms sen (Deut.Bank &_ Dis c.Ges-.: )- CoalMln. &~Ov-:- T - ---6----~-
- -8 -- --~ -·f-·· -~: :~--
18 . Friedrich Reinhart (Comm . u . Privatbank) Coal Min . & Met . Ov. '5 --
3 
22 ,7 35 ,7 
9 . Dr . h .c . Wilh . Kleemann (Dresdner Bank ) Textile Industry 15 ,8 - 100 
W . Kehl (Deut.Bank & Disconto Ge-s e ll.) --Coal M l n .- & Met. Ov. 8 
3 
2 
42 ,1 _I' 19 , 1 
S. Bodenheimer (Darmst. u . Nat ionalbank) - Banking---- 15,8 30 
G . Sintenis (Berliner Handelsgesellschaft ) Brew .& Spirits + Glas 10 ,5 100 
1 . J . Goldschm idt (Darm sI. und Nat.bank) 
2. Oscar Schlitter (Deul.Bank & Disc .Gesell. ) 
'3. KSo bernheim( C-om-m . u. P rivatbank ) 
4. H . Nathan (Dresdner Bank) 
5 . O . Jeidels (B erliner Hande ls gesellschaft) 
H . Guttmann (5r esdne-r -Bank) --
7. -Dr~ g . So Ims s e n (D-e-uTBan-f&Disc-:-G-es- ) -
8 . Friedrich Reinhart (Com m . u . P rivatbank ) 
9. Dr . h .c . Wilh . Kleemann (Dresdner Bank ) 
W .- Kehl (Deut. B- ank & Disconto- GesellT 
S . Bodenheim er (Darm sI. u . Nationalbank) 
G . Sintenis (Berliner Handelsgeseilschaft ) 
[S ource : S al ing's B orsenpapiere , Vol. 1930] 
Second most seat sector 
Electricity 7 12 ,9 77 ,8 
Electricity 7 16 ,3 31 ,8 
COnslructTo'n materials 5 12,8 --62,5 
E lectricity- 5 17 ,9 55 ,6 
Metal Industry 4 16 80 
Metal Ind u stry- ---- 4 ' -1 6 -'5'0--
---E le cTriCity------- ---4"--- '-1 6,7-----18,"2--
Banking 3 13,6 20 
M etal Industry 3 15 ,8 37,5 
Te xt i le Inlustry 4 21-,1 - - 36,4--
Coa l M in . & Met. Ov. 3 15,8 15,8 
Mach . & Railway eq . 2 10 ,5 28 ,6 
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main players during the fusion process of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke76• Having many 
of his supervisory board seats located in the coal mining and metal sector may have 
served him to play a co-ordinating role in the fusion-process . 
To conclude, from the results presented in tables VI.I and VI.2, it would appear that 
the spread of supervisory board seats of top-l 0 directors was not random, but often 
quite concentrated in certain sectors. By specialising in few sectors directors might, 
through gaining knowledge of the sector as a whole, have enabled themselves to spend 
less time on individual firms, without losing the capacity to monitor effectively. 
Having a lot of seats, therefore, may not necessarily have meant a decline in the 
supervising ability of a Great Bank director. In some cases it also may have made it 
easier to play a key role in reorganising an industrial sector. 
76 W. Han emann, op.ci t., p.87 . 
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4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this dissertation has been to investigate whether Rudolf 
Hilferding's prediction, made in 1910, that the German Great Banks would 
increasingly get involved in all sectors of the economy, taking a co-ordinating role, 
was justified by developments during the Weimar period. This has been done first by 
looking at the cross-sectoral spread of supervisory board seats of directors of eight 
Great Banks and second, by investigating whether the sectoral spread of supervisory 
board seats could be correlated to the sectoral spread of bank loans . Debate about the 
importance of bank directors' supervisory board seats as means to monitor and shape 
firm policy or even co-ordinate the restructuring of a sector has raised two more 
issues, which were taken into consideration. First, the effect of more than one Great 
Bank director having a seat on the supervisory board of a finn was looked at. Second, 
the sectoral composition of supervisory board seats of Great Bank directors with many 
seats was analysed. 
It was found that overall the sectoral shares of supervisory board seats of Grossbank-
directors taken as a group did not change much during the 1920s. Supervisory board 
seats of bank directors were concentrated in five out of twenty-five sectors between 
1921 and 1930, i.c. coal mining & metal ovens, metal industry, electricity, machinery 
& railway equipment and banking. After 1925 there was some decline in the number 
of seats held by Great Bank directors in the five top sectors, but it remained more than 
50% of the total of their seats. The decline probably was connected to mergers within 
industry and amongst the Great Banks themselves. The increased concentration within 
industries as a result of the merger movement itself would be consistent with 
Hilferding's predictions, but the lack of Great Bank expansion outside traditional 
sectors not. 
The investigation ofthe Great Banks as a group was complemented with a study of the 
sectoral spread of directors' supervisory board seats for individual Great Banks. The 
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results by and large confirmed the findings of the group study, although shifts of 
relative seat shares between the five top sectors were sometimes more marked. The 
shifts in sectoral shares in individual Great Banks were probably partly due to mergers 
between Great Banks during the 1920's. 
The result of the study of sectoral spread of supervisory board seats could be used 
more convincingly as evidence against Hilferding's idea of increased cross-sectoral 
involvement of the Great Banks, if it could be related to the financial activities of the 
Great Banks. In order to obtain some notion of the seat-loan relationship, the sectoral 
spread of Great Bank loans and the sectoral spread of Great Bank directors' 
supervisory board seats were compared. A positive correlation between the two was 
found. The big exception to the pattern was the chemical industry, to which the Great 
Banks provided substantial loans, but where few of their directors' supervisory board 
seats were located. 
A closer look at the position of the largest of the Great Banks, the Deutsche Bank, in 
sectors where its directors had many supervisory board seats, revealed that providing 
loans did not necessarily mean having substantial influence. The pre-WWI support 
given to firms had often led to emancipation and the size of the dominant firms in 
sectors like coal mining, chemicals and electricity had often increased so much, that 
an individual Great Bank could not provide the financial requirements of these firms 
anymore by itself. The representation of Deutsche Bank directors on the supervisory 
boards of large conglomerates in these cases was more an expression of friendly 
relations than of current leverage. 
In the exceptional case of Mannesmahnrohren, Deutsche Bank remained able to shape 
firm policy, however not so much because of its role as credit supplier, as through 
holding the majority of Mannesmanrohren's shares. In the case of medium sized and 
small firms , more frequently located sectors like machinery and railway equipment, 
providing loans could give a Great Bank a substantial say in a firm's affairs, as 
46 
Deutsche Bank's involvement with the car company Daimler-Benz during the 1920s 
shows. In such cases supervisory board seats often were the expression of 
considerable bank influence. 
As for the claim that the representation of more than one Great Bank on the 
supervisory board of a [urn resulted in a decrease in influence of individual Great 
Banks and an increase in competition between Great Banks, only the first part of the 
argument was continued. It was found that for the Great Banks as a group the 
percentage of companies where more than one Great Bank was represented, increased 
during the 1920s in the many-seat-sectors. This could be interpreted as a decrease in 
the influence of individual Great Banks. However, this did not necessarily entail an 
increase in competition between the Great Banks. Co-operation in the form of 
consortia, sometimes leading to fusion, occurred as a strategy to regain strength vis-a-
vis industry. 
Finally, the controversy about the effect of the accumulation of many supervisory 
board seats by individual Great Bank directors was considered. Often those who 
featured on the list of ten directors with most supervisory board seats in 1921 were 
still in the top 10 by 1930. Most many-seat-directors had most of their seats located in 
heavy industry sectors, like the coal mining and metal industries. Moreover, often they 
accounted for a large part of a Great Banks' seats in these sectors. It seems to be the 
case, therefore, that many-seat-directors not seldom had areas of special interest. This 
finding could be used to oppose the argument that bank directors with many 
supervisory board seats, lacked time and knowledge to monitor effectively. As these 
directors were at the same time sectora1 specialists, knowledge of a sector could have 
led to more efficient monitoring of individual [urns in a sector requiring less of a 
director's time. In some cases the bank directors with most supervisory board seats in a 
sector, also were the ones who were most active in the re-organisation of the sector. 
To conclude, the tendency of German Great Banks during the Weimar period to 
remain most active in those sectors where they were most active before WWI, was not 
4 7 
consistent with the predictions of Hilferding's theory of Finance Capital. Although in 
some cases the Great Banks tried to foster new industries, they were not as successful 
in the 1920s as during the period 1870-1914. Staying involved in what had by the 
1920s become 'traditional' heavy industry sectors usually meant staying involved as a 
junior partner for the Great Banks. The concentration process in the heavy industry 
sectors had progressed at a much quicker pace than in the banking sector itself, freeing 
industrial conglomerates from bank tutelage they had sometimes experienced during 
the early period of industrialisation. 
48 
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